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This paper tries to provide a fresh insight on a highly disputed, although very
sectorial topic, represented by intellectual property protection on genetically
modiﬁed seed and, in general, on agricultural biotechnology products. Both
because of the wide employ of seeds and plant varieties in agriculture and for the
international relevance of intellectual property protection, domestic perspectives
on this very topic soon become obsolete, partial and useless. Intellectual property
protection on agricultural biotechnology products is a charged topic for a
number of reasons. First of all, seeds are the starting point of very complex value
chains in all economies. That does not relate exclusively to food. Indeed, plants
have now a role in a wide number of very diverse industries such as biofuels or
textiles or construction materials. Most of all, seeds are indispensable for the
production of vegetables, for a large part of the worldwide population the
primary, if not exclusive, ingredient of the daily diet.
1 Introduction
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to provide a new legal perspective about the intersection
of intellectual property protection and contract techniques to manage the use of
seeds in agriculture, and, more speciﬁcally, genetically modiﬁed seeds that show
resistance to pesticides, have higher yield and are less exposed to climate hurdles.
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There is a heated debate on biotechnology applied to agriculture. Intellectual
property protection is one of the controversial issues involved, since the
agro-business in most advanced economies is strongly incentivized by, and heavily
relying on, patents. Less developed countries suffer from costly access to agricul-
tural technologies needed to improve productivity. At the same time, such countries
experience a paradox, since their territories are usually rich in terms of biodiversity
and signiﬁcant varieties. What can be eventually subject to genetic modiﬁcations
and patented by large biotech companies comes indeed from those countries.
Bio-piracy is one of those almost unregulated practices that end up being a serious
wound for populations of less developed countries and a negative externality for the
world population at large.
The main question that this paper aims to discuss is whether law as a technique
to regulate and balance the interests of parties involved (farmers, communities,
agro-bio companies) can have an effective role in governing the several models of
agriculture and can be instrumental in supporting alternative business models that
could co-exist with the current agro-bio business also in less developed countries. If
law cannot be a factor of competitiveness for states (without triggering the usual
race to the bottom), at least legal solutions can introduce strategies of differentiation
among states, towards different models of economic growth.
2 The Problem: Intellectual Property Applied to Seeds
Seeds are an extremely important element of any eco-system as they are at the
beginning of life, as far as the vegetal world is concerned. Access to seeds is a
precondition for a number of farming activities which are primarily, but not
exclusively, aimed at providing food to people. They include also the production of
biofuels or of textiles and other critical raw materials. No matter how small a seed
is, it is the initial ingredient of large, extended and complex value chains for all
countries.
Because of the increase in the worldwide population and the alleged constant
need for food, it has been thought that biotechnology applied to agriculture would
have brought signiﬁcant advancements in terms of pesticide resistant, high yield
varieties that would have required less land, less water, less pesticides and less
fertilizers to grow.1 To achieve those purposes, technology can act, and has an
impact, at different levels of the value chain of agriculture-based products.2 Seeds
are the primary asset and the starting point of the chain; acting at that level appeared
1The world population is expected to grow from the current 6.4 billion people to 9.3 billion in
2050, with a yearly growth of 77 million.
2For instance, researchers have been experimenting natural, eco-compatible polymers to reduce
consumption of water. See, for instance, Demitri et al. (2013).
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as particularly fruitful for agricultural biotechnology and techniques of genetic
engineering have soon proved effective.3
The problem with biotechnological research (not necessarily referred only to the
seed industry) is its cost and the need for expensive and complex instrumentation
and procedures to deal with the extraordinarily complex structure of living
organisms. Just as an example, researchers from the United States Department of
Agriculture have recently announced the sequencing of the wheat genome. It has
been an incredibly intense task, as it turned out that the wheat (Triticum aes-
tivum) has between 94,000 and 96,000 genes, which is ﬁve times the size of the
human genome.4 Large investments have been made for an achievement that is an
initial step to use genetic information to improve productivity and resistance.5
Unless states provide funding ex ante for intensive research and development
activities mainly to public research organizations and academic institutions, most
investments are undertaken by private companies that strongly rely on ex post
exclusivity via intellectual property protection to ensure a return on investment for
their research efforts.6 In this regard, the evolution of the relationship between
technology and intellectual property rights is no different from other ﬁelds, in all
possible respects.7 If, indeed, the private industry is championing the use of
exclusive rights to ensure ex post incentives to investments in biotechnological
research (with all the implications in terms of lobbying on governments in order to
strengthen and possibly expand the scope of protection), small farmers and less
developed countries protest against the use of intellectual property in this segment
of agriculture and, particularly, on seeds.8 Protection increases prices, that for the
poorest populations is the real barrier in accessing seeds and, consequently, food.
3But a ruthful critique to agricultural biotechnology comes from the influential work of Altieri
(2015).
4See Brenchley et al. (2012).
5Bread wheat is a crucial crop for human life, since it accounts for 20 % of the calories consumed
by humans. The current threat for wheat is a fungal disease identiﬁed as Ug99 (also known as stem
rust), which is responsible for severe losses of crops in Africa, Asia and the Middle East since
1999. The study of the genome becomes instrumental to identify techniques that make wheat more
resistant.
6There have been situations in which intellectual property protection has been sought also where
the recurrence of an invention was doubtful, although investments for discovery had been
signiﬁcant. It is the case of the Myriad Genetics case, where the applicant tried to retain patent
protection on two genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2) sequenced (an activity that required intense effort)
even if the genes where not technically invented. See Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. (2013).
7At least in the United States, the federal government has had a crucial role in supplying farmers
with seeds for over 100 years, before the private industry took over and started lobbying for
increased intellectual property protection. For a detailed account of the evolution of the industry,
see Center for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds, Seed Giants vs. Farmers, Washington, D.C., 2013,
13 (reporting that by the turn of the 19th Century the U.S. Department of Agriculture had
distributed over a billion bags of seeds to farmers in the United States).
8The problem is not a new one. It had been already described by Busch et al. (1990).
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Hard words are spoken and the difﬁculty of ﬁnding an equilibrium has been por-
trayed as a “seed war”.9
Also from this perspective, things are apparently not different from other ﬁelds
of the technology, and most remarkably in the ﬁeld of software and digital cre-
ations. The assumption is that some resources (and, in this case, the germplasm of
seeds) are commons and should be shielded by any attempt to extend proprietary
rights on them. Yet, a closer look at the problem reveals that the situation is way
more complex than in other sectors where supporters and critics of intellectual
property protection are at war.
Access to seeds is considered a pre-condition for a number of practices in
communities of farmers (mostly selecting the best seeds from the best plants, saving
them for the next season—a practice also termed “brown-bagging”—and
exchanging with seeds from other farmers), aimed at preserving biodiversity and
increasing productivity by natural selection techniques. Across generations of
seeds, varieties have been naturally improved and have become heritage of those
communities. Such practices are basically inexpensive, not artiﬁcial (as cross pol-
lination occurs naturally) and do not alter natural ecosystems where such seeds are
employed. Most importantly, there are no exclusive rights at play that somehow
constrain use. Actually, the exchange of seeds is an exchange of opportunities for
improved local productions on smaller and larges scales.
Intellectual property protection kicks in when the selection process is triggered
and achieved by means of biotechnological methods by manipulating the genetic
information of the plant. The basic assumption is that the level of productivity
should be increased and natural techniques of selection do not serve this purpose
adequately (or timely, since they follow the time scale of nature and seasons).
Moreover, because of atmospheric and bacteriological agents, plants should be
made more resistant and genetic engineering is instrumental to that goal.
Exclusive rights applied to seeds means that the use of such fundamental
ingredients of farming can (and in fact is) now heavily influenced by the intellectual
property owner. Consequently, access to seeds is conditioned and practices of
conservation and exchange of seeds become essentially forbidden to the extent they
frustrate the interest of owners and do not earn their consent.
There are additional problems caused by the combined use of genetically
modiﬁed seeds and intellectual property protection. First of all, since engineered
seeds are resistant to pesticides, the selection process makes then dominant over
time; other less resistant varieties are doomed to gradually disappear. In short,
biodiversity is at jeopardy and varieties that may have important properties can get
lost. Furthermore, since many agricultural regimes end up becoming monoculture,
they are less resilient and intrinsically vulnerable to events and pests that might
destroy them altogether. And since monoculture is at the opposite of rotation, land
is doomed to a progressive impoverishment, which in turn justiﬁes the massive
resort to chemical fertilizers. Of course, biotechnology is at work here to make sure
9For an uncompromising reading see Shiva (2015).
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that all this does not happen, but more resistant varieties come at the cost of more
expensive access to protected technology; the problem, in a sense, is only post-
poned and the case for agricultural biotechnology is reinforced.
There are also ethical, technological and inevitably legal discussions about the
opportunity of using transgenic varieties to produce food; science has not been able
so far to clearly deﬁne whether there is a genuine risk for human health and for
nature coming from use of genetically modiﬁed plants.10 No matter how important
this discussion is, its scope goes beyond the aim of this paper, which is to deal with
genetically modiﬁed seeds from the perspective of the incentives created by
intellectual property protection regimes and their impact at transnational level. After
all, if given applications of biotech are risky for health it is not a matter that depends
directly on intellectual property and the focus should be rather on the nature and
results of biotechnology applied to food.
Intellectual property protection applied to genetically modiﬁed seeds appears
problematic in a number of respects. As we have seen, exclusive rights provide the
legal infrastructure for the industry to limit those practices that are at odds with the
proprietary prerogatives and that would reduce the proﬁtability of trade in seeds.
Conflicts arise among supporters and opponents as in any other ﬁeld of technology
and there is a movement that equals seeds to commons and urges to reconsider the
use of intellectual property in agriculture, where a commons regime is more con-
sistent with agricultural practices, particularly in smaller communities of farmers.
Moreover, there is also the suspect (somehow documented by evidence) that
agricultural biotechnology is over-incentivized by intellectual property protection.
The outcome is an apparent (and dangerous) diversion of the original purpose of the
policy, which is no longer to support investments to improve agriculture, but to
increase proﬁtability, even when there is no technical problem to be solved, by
artiﬁcially creating or reinforcing the rationale for biotechnological investments
and, consequently, intellectual property protection.11
2.1 The Problem with Exhaustion of Rights
There is one peculiarity of biotechnological inventions that, when referred to
genetically modiﬁed seeds, is a major source of legal problems for any patent
policy, as well as for rights holders. Biotechnological inventions can refer to
10One remarkable case involves the production of transgenic corn in Italy. Until recently, there
have been cases brought before administrative judges to challenge the decision of health
authorities to deny authorization to put in commerce and employ in agriculture transgenic varieties.
See, for instance, T.a.r. Lazio 23 Aprile, 2014, n. 4410, in Ambiente, 2014, 548, conﬁrmed by
Cons. Stato 6 febbraio 2015, n. 605 (not yet published).
11See Center for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds, Seed Giants vs. Farmers, cit., 15.
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organisms that have the ability to be self-reproducing12; in other words, alike other
inventions in different ﬁelds of technology, they are living matter.
The root of the problem is straightforward. The general rationale behind intel-
lectual property rights is simple: imitation of a protected item is infringement.
Protected items can be bought and used and even resold downstream or donated,
but cannot be generally reproduced without permission of the intellectual property
owner. The ﬁrst sale of a protected good causes exhaustion of protection, in con-
nection with the payment of a consideration (a supra-competitive price) that is
supposed to compensate the inventor for its investments. Typically, exhaustion does
not affect the limitation to create copies of the protected items, even if such items
have been lawfully acquired in exchange for a price.
But what if the protected technological good can create copies of itself, by
reproducing the features that are subject to patent protection? Does the exhaustion
effect still take place or it never does? And in the latter case, can the patent owner
control the technology all along the value chain, no matter how it is used, by whom,
how many times, for whatever purposes until the patent is in force?
These interrogatives are clearly technology-speciﬁc; they refer to biotechnology
and, as far as genetically modiﬁed seeds are concerned, they pose a serious issue for
patent policy.13 Limiting protection to the ﬁrst sale would be probably not enough
in terms of incentives for the agro-bio industry. On the other hand, accepting the
fact that protection is never exhausted turns out to be a multifaceted problem, ﬁrst in
terms of overprotection and costs that the public at large may be called to bear,
second for the discrimination among technologies, that could have an impact on
industries and markets.14 This is a puzzle that requires legal solution and although
each legal system can come up with its own solution, the consequences and the
effects of each choice can go well beyond the national borders. Regulation can have
direct internal impact (beneﬁtting the intellectual property holder or farmers), but it
has also certainly external effects by influencing at transnational level the choice of
the industry to commercialize given technologies and to extend the operations in
given countries. In this respect, the link among intellectual property protection,
international trade and foreign direct investments is clear and strong. Regulation of
12This feature is recognized as structurally distinctive for biotechnologies; see for instance art. 2,
par. 1, lett. (a) of European Directive 98/44/EC.
13For a discussion on the alternative options, see Downing-Howk (2004).
14One remarkable difference that emerges in considering exhaustion of rights relates to software,
that, alike seeds, is not self-reproducing but, like seeds, can be “generative” of further products by
preserving a constant trait. Quite interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a sale of a product
that incorporates a software process technology causes the exhaustion effect. See Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). For a comment on the decision see
also The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: The Impact of Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
in 14 Va. J.L. Tech. 273, 283 (2009). Software and seeds have been considered showing some
common traits by Leaven (2008), that criticizes the different conclusions on exhaustion. But the
argument of similarity goes back to the opinion of the advocate general Mischo in the European
case SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery c. La Hesbignonne SC (in ECR, 1988, 1919).
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intellectual property has effects on other policies and affects other aspects of the
market.
More importantly, if exclusive rights are persistent for self-reproducing tech-
nologies, the right holders can continue ruling about the way the technology can be
used, thus perpetuating their will (not only their exclusive rights) downstream and
imposing models to users that might further limit farmers’ freedom. This power
might go well beyond what is needed in terms of incentives for the industry.
3 Contracts for the Circulation of Genetically Modified
Seeds
Intuitively, coupled with the problem of patent protection for genetically modiﬁed
seeds is the use of contracts to control the value chain by intellectual property
owners and to reduce the risks of farmers’ behaviors that would seriously harm the
protection and reduce the proﬁtability of innovative technologies.
Proprietary protection is a necessary condition to be rewarded and receive
incentives to invest in genetically modiﬁed varieties. But it is not sufﬁcient. The
intrinsic limitation of exhaustion is, so to say, a genetic trait of patent protection,
and a very troublesome one. Moreover, there are several farming practices that
require a further level of restriction not allowed by patents, but certainly available
through contractual terms. Since exhaustion effects come from sales, and sales are
contracts, one way to control circulation is precisely to act on sales terms and
conditions, by conforming the use of purchased seeds to the commercial strategy of
the rights holder.
To fully understand the use of contract to control the circulation and the use of
seeds it is worth recalling that genetically modiﬁed seeds are commodities bought
by farmers for sowing. What is protected is not the seed per se (that is, the portion
of physical matter), but the process technology that is responsible for the deﬁnitive
modiﬁcation of the germplasm as it results in the genetic information eventually
contained in the seed.15 Purchasing the seed also implies accessing the technology,
which is an inseparable feature of the seed.
In order to prevent exhaustion of patent protection that insists on the technology,
the agro-bio industry has come up with an ingenuous mechanism that relies on
contracts. Thus, when farmers buy seeds in bulk (typically packed in bags of
different size), the transaction is construed as a complex contract that blends a sale
(of the seed as such) and a license (of the incorporated proprietary technology).
Terms and conditions of the license are typically ﬁne-printed on sealed bags and
a more speciﬁc clause warns purchasers that opening the bag and using the seeds
signiﬁes acceptance. Those familiar with software technology contracts will rec-
ognize a mechanism of contract formation that is analogous to shrink-wrap licenses
and that might raise the same doubts about the meaning of the consent exchanged
15Because of the nature of technology (a process), protection extends to the outcome of the
process, that is the genetically modiﬁed seed.
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(to be sure, the mechanism is also termed “bag-tag” or “seed-wrap” licensing, by
analogy with other –wrap like agreements).16 Patent and technology owners are
thus able to impose unilaterally contractual terms to the purchaser that is at the same
time a licensee of the technology subject to rights and obligations concerning its
use.17
More in details, contract terms require the farmer to use the seeds only for one
season and not to replant second generation seeds (that is, seeds that come from
plants that are grown by sowing the seeds purchased in the ﬁrst place). Moreover,
the farmer cannot exchange the seeds with other seeds, whether his own or third
parties’. If seeds are exchanged and used for replanting, the recipient of the seeds is
an infringer (because patent protection is still effective and the terms of the
agreement are enforceable), while the provider is in breach of the license. The
recipient can then be pursued not on contractual ground, because technically there
is no relationship between him and the technology owner (no privity), but because
he is accessing a piece of intellectual property without consent where the protected
feature is still subject to exclusive rights. All these contractual prohibitions are
made possible by the fact that the ﬁrst sale (that includes a license) has not tech-
nically caused exhaustion.18 Here again, it has to be recalled the difference between
biotechnology and software technology.19
Once purchased, seeds are then used for sowing, but since plants coming from
seeds yield seeds on their turn, and the variety is genetically modiﬁed, the next
generation of seeds is identical to the former and still featuring the proprietary traits.
Needless to say, exhaustion is prevented by the fact that the embedded technology
is licensed and not sold and contractual terms can introduce in the contractual
relationships the whole set of limitations that have been previously mentioned.
To a mind not exposed to legal sophistications, such mechanisms can appear as
artiﬁcial and complex; and so they are. Their effectiveness results from the com-
bination of proprietary rights and contract techniques whose immediate outcome is
16The seed-wrap licensing practice has been approved by a number of lower courts in the United
States and then afﬁrmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 534 U.S. 124 (2001) at
145.
17The context is of a typical business-to-business transaction, with standardized terms unilaterally
written and imposed to farmers by the owner of the critical (intellectual property protected)
resource.
18The International Seed Federation has expressed its view on the topic of exhaustion by stating
that there should be no exception for farm-saved seeds under any form of intellectual property right
(see ISF View on Intellectual Property, Rio de Janeiro, 2012, 26).
19And it is a difference that comparatively is stronger in Europe than in the U.S., after the ECJ
decision in UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. (ECJ 3 July 2012, C-128/11), that has
interpreted the European directive on software as meaning that the right of distribution of a copy of
a computer program is exhausted if the copyright holder who has authorized, even free of charge,
the downloading of that copy from the internet onto a data carrier has also conferred, in return for
payment of a fee intended to enable him to obtain a remuneration corresponding to the economic
value of the copy of the work of which he is the proprietor, a right to use that copy for an unlimited
period. For a comment, Göbel (2012).
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to perpetuate patent protection across generations of seeds and to subject farmers to
the intellectual property rights of the growers.
The combined effect of contracts and property comes at the inevitable cost of
forcing contracts as mechanisms to control circulation and use of seeds. The
mechanism is effective to the extent the terms and conditions of the agreement are
enforceable, but the enforceability has to be tested against legal theories on contract
formation at national level. Since contract law is still largely national, the viability
of contractual solutions by intellectual property owners cannot be afﬁrmed once and
for all legal systems. Although there is a trend to consider such arrangements as
valid, still occasionally some courts might object to their enforceability.20
As a matter of fact, through the mentioned combination of intellectual property
and contracts, the agro-bio industry is able to retain absolute control of the value
chain and to extend its powers to connected market (such as that for chemical
products, including pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers). Going back to the
mainstream arguments of the debate, without intellectual property there would not
be any new genetically modiﬁed variety. If exhaustion effects worked as in any
other instance of intellectual property protection, the incentives would be reduced
(if not eliminated), as the ﬁrst sale of a self-replicating technology would then make
it available to anyone at no cost. The use of seed-wrap licenses relies on, and at the
same time reinforces, patent protection on seeds.
Negative externalities are apparent. Without intellectual property protection,
downstream activities implying the use of seeds would be unfettered and common
practices of saving, exchanging and replanting seeds would be perfectly lawful.
Resort to intellectual property is a real game changer and a large part of negative
effects (starting from loss of biodiversity) comes from the operation of this
mechanism and should become part of the equation for balancing grants of
exclusive rights with social beneﬁts to access.
4 Normative Framework that Applies to Genetically
Modified Seeds and How It Deals with the Problems
Above
The agro-bio industry has an interest in applying uniformly the solutions devised at
contractual level to prevent exhaustion, reinforce intellectual property protection,
manage risks and increase proﬁtability. In a globalized world, such solutions can be
seen as a genuine expression of a new lex mercatoria or, more brutally, the attempt
of multinational corporations to opt out from a legal system and to impose their
own laws. To the extent national courts enforce such contractual arrangements, they
give a pass to them to freely circulate in the market as legally viable solutions and to
propagate into other legal systems (when circulation of models is path dependent).
20For a discussion of techniques of contract formation in comparative perspective see Granieri
(2015).
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Pressures to modify intellectual property laws in a more favorable way to
industry, although powerful (because of the lobbies), have limited effect since
international treaties within the Word Intellectual Property Organization require
consensus, that is more and more difﬁcult to obtain for the opposition of those
countries that are negatively affected by the practice of multinational corporations.21
On the other hand, contract law remains mostly a national matter and it shows more
flexibility; empty spaces left by legislators can be easily ﬁlled in by private ordering
and freedom of contracts.
The legal question then is to see which are the limits of private autonomy when
dealing with intellectual property protection on genetically modiﬁed seeds. The
question does not have a general and abstract answer. It must be dealt with still
under the state laws where contracts are used by the industry to engineer solutions
that are consistent with its own goals.
In a number of recent cases, Monsanto—which is one of the few large multi-
national corporations in the ﬁeld, epitomizing the archetype of the globalized player
in the agro-bio market22—has been testing for some time now from a legal
standpoint the enforceability of its contractual arrangements for the distribution of
patented genetically modiﬁed seeds. In particular, the company owns patents related
to soy modiﬁed with DNA-recombinants techniques that make the seeds resistant to
herbicides and, more speciﬁcally, to glysophate-based products (also patented and
sold by the same corporation).23 This technology is worldwide known as the
Roundup Ready®.
21As a matter of fact, the Doha Development Round negotiations started in 2001 are still blocked
and agriculture is one of the most relevant dealbreakers.
22According to some sources, Monsanto is responsible for the commercialization of 90 % of all
genetically modiﬁed organisms worldwide. It has been also the topic for a documentary by Robin
(2015), where all the major critiques towards the company are counted by the author.
23In at least one case, Monsanto’s patent claims are direct to a method for controlling weeds with
its technology. See US patent n. 5,352,605 its reissue RE39,247 (claim 32): «A method for
selectively controlling weeds in a ﬁeld containing a crop having plant crop seeds or plants
comprising the steps of: (a) planting the crop seeds or plants which are glyphosate-tolerant as a
result of a recombinant double-stranded DNA molecule being inserted into the crop seed or plant,
the DNA molecule having: (i) a promoter which functions in plant cells to cause the production of
an RNA sequence, (ii) a structural DNA sequence that causes the production of an RNA sequence
which encodes an EPSPS enzyme having the sequence domains: -R-X.sub.1-H-X.sub.2-E-(SEQ
ID NO:37), in which X.sub.1 is G, S, T, C, Y, N, Q, D or E; X.sub.2 is S or T; and -G-D-K-X.
sub.3-(SEQ ID NO:38), in which X.sub.3 is S or T; and -S-A-Q-X.sub.4-K-(SEQ ID NO:39), in
which X.sub.4 is A, R, N, D, C, Q, E, G, H, I, L, K, M, F, P, S, T, W, Y or V; and -N-X.
sub.5-T-R-(SEQ ID NO:40), in which X.sub.5 is A, R, N, D, C, Q, E, G, H, I, L, K, M, F, P, S, T,
W, Y or V, .Iadd. provided that when X.sub.1 is D, X.sub.2 is T, X.sub.3 is S, and X.sub.4 is V,
then X.sub.5 is A, R, N, D, C, Q, E, G, H, I, L, K, M, F, S, T, W, Y or V.Iaddend.; and (iii) a 3’
non-translated DNA sequence which functions in plant cells to cause the addition of a stretch of
polyadenyl nucleotides to the 3’ end of the RNA sequence where the promoter is heterologous
with respect to the structural DNA sequence and adapted to cause sufﬁcient expression of the
EPSPS enzyme to enhance the glyphosate tolerance of the crop plant transformed with the DNA
molecule; and (b) applying to the crop and weeds in the ﬁeld a sufﬁcient amount of glyphosate
herbicide to control the weeds without signiﬁcantly affecting the crop».
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Monsanto uses a double channel to distribute its products: directly via farmers
and, indirectly, via growers that are responsible for duplication and sale to farmers.
In both cases Monsanto uses a standard form contract, called the Monsanto
Technology Steward Agreement (Monsanto TSA) under which the several tech-
nologies owned by the company are licensed to growers and farmers. Monsan-
to TSA is a single-use license, meaning that the purchaser of the seed is allowed to
use the seeds «solely for a single planting of a commercial crop» (art. 4.f). Addi-
tionally it introduces a number of limitations concerning saving, transferring,
cleaning or conducting research on patented seeds. Second generation seeds (those
obtained by planting the purchased seeds) can be sold as commodity seeds to local
grain elevators, that typically do not suffer limitations in reselling such seeds.
In the U.S. case Monsanto v. Bowman, a farmer had bought for years patented
seeds from growers licensed by Monsanto, complying with the licensing terms. Due
to the need of a second (and riskier) sowing in the same year, Bowman starts
acquiring lower price seeds from a local elevator and starts mixing those seeds with
third generation seeds (clearly breaching the terms of the Monsanto TSA).24 When
Monsanto brings an action against Bowman, the farmer raises, among other things,
the defense of exhaustion of rights: purchasing seeds from those who do not suffer
limitations (such as grain elevators) should trigger the application of the ﬁrst-sale
doctrine and return freedom of operation to the farmer.
Bowman’s argument is not accepted by the district court and by the court of
appeals. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and there was a
feeling that the appellate decision might be overturned in favor of the farmer. But an
unanimous court ruled once again in favor of Monsanto.
Since at least 1992, U.S. courts have supported the practice of Monsanto to tie a
sale and a license and to introduce post-sale restrictions to farmers when purchasing
patented seeds. In one case, judges justiﬁed such practices with the need to protect
public health and to limit exposure to products liability. The same rationale has
been applied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to all
self-reproducing biotechnological innovations.25 Bowman does not come as a
surprise, nor the judges’ sentence that applying the ﬁrst sale doctrine to the
derivatives (generations) of self-reproducing technologies «would eviscerate the
rights of the patent holder».
24Because genetically-modiﬁed seeds are resistant to glysophate, while natural seeds are not,
Monsanto’s agents can easily verify whether one ﬁeld is planted with natural or modiﬁed seeds.
Spraying herbicides will kill the natural plants and weeds and will keep alive genetically modiﬁed
varieties. If the farmer cannot show the bag where the seeds were stored, he is clearly an infringer.
Monsanto has been also criticized for the forceful manners of its agents in collecting evidence,
sometimes trespassing farmers’ property. Monsanto’s practices are also described by Johns (2009,
p. 16). Enforcement techniques can produce false positives in case of the so called blown-by seeds,
that is, situations in which genetically modiﬁed varieties are found in ﬁelds where seeds had not
been used intentionally by farmers, but brought by the wind from adjacent ﬁelds.
25U.S. courts introduced the distinction between conditioned and not conditioned sales; exhaustion
only applies to the latter and not in all cases in which the seller has put conditions in the terms of
the agreement, which is exactly the case with seed-wrap licenses.
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The U.S. Supreme Court had requested an opinion to the Solicitor General
before issuing the decision in Bowman and this circumstance had been interpreted
as if the Court would be ready to reverse the Court of Appeals’ opinion and
introduce a principle that applies the exhaustion principle also for self-replicating
technologies.26 But it was not the case. An unanimous Court reinforced the position
that «[t]he exhaustion doctrine is limited to the “particular item” sold to avoid just
such a mismatch between invention and reward». The ﬁrst sale of the seed does not
terminate the rights of the holder: «“a second creation” of the patented item “call[s]
the monopoly, conferred by the patent grant, into play for a second time”».27 The
problem, one could just add, is in the fact that the monopoly could be called into
play for the entire life of the patent and no matter how many generations of seeds
are grown.
Importantly, the Court was clear to say that the power to prevent the use of
second generation seeds stems directly from the kind of patent protection that
attaches to biotechnological inventions and it is not dependent on contract terms.
Hence, such terms are perfectly valid, as they are not aimed at unlawfully extending
the exclusive rights granted by the patent.
4.1 Life After Bowman and European Union Law
Bowman is an interesting case, for a number of reasons. First of all, it reached the
Supreme Court and it won a nine-zero opinion that is a strong signal about the
practice of Monsanto and seed owners, thus setting a precedent that might have an
influence even outside the jurisdiction of the United States.28 Secondly, it endorses
a different treatment for biotechnological innovations concerning self-reproducing
technologies, that in fact are never subject to exhaustion, thus becoming stronger
and more pervasive than any other innovation, but also raising the issue of con-
sistency between intellectual property policy and other values (such as the pro-
motion of biodiversity). Thirdly, it shows how, in the U.S. legal system, the sources
of law interact on this very topic, where contract law remains essentially state law,
whereas patent protection is federal law; enforcement of contracts for circulation of
intellectual property rights is somehow influenced, at state level, by federal laws
and this has also been considered as an area of potential friction at the interface of
state and federal regulation. The U.S. case provides a good benchmark for
26According to Duffy (2010), the request of an opinion is an element that typically predicts the
decision to grant certiorari to reverse the case. Empirical data on the relationship between requests
of opinion and decisions are available in Thompson and Wachtell (2009).
27The Court of Appeals had been more cautious and justice Kagan afﬁrmed that the decision did
not aim to apply to all instances of «self-replicating products», although «such inventions are
becoming even more prevalent, complex, and diverse»; see Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
28Importantly, national solutions about exhaustion are extremely important because international
sources, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),
refuse to deal with this topic and leave it up to states sovereignty.
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European regulation, where the creation of an internal market by EU legislation has
been jeopardized in many occasions by contractual practices that were deemed to be
enforceable under state laws.
On the territories of the European Union the situation, at legal level, shows some
differences, at least as far as genetically modiﬁed seeds are concerned. There might
be political and economic reasons that justify the European view of the problem;
after all, the main agro-bio companies are U.S. multinationals and the European
industry, with few remarkable exceptions, lags behind. But it might well be that a
casual legal difference provides the basis for a strategy of legal differentiation at
regional level, that might compensate the negative externalities produced, at
international level, by a more relaxed treatment of contracts for the circulation of
intellectual property rights on genetically modiﬁed seeds.
The principle of exhaustion, created initially by case law, has been instrumental
in supporting the process of market integration in Europe, by limiting the power of
intellectual property owners and the ability for them to control the circulation of
goods downstream once a merchandise has been put in commerce on the European
territory.29 It has been then incorporated into patent laws (and intellectual property
laws in general).
Since 1988, in Erauw-Jacquery, the European Court of Justice acknowledged
that some restrictions in license agreements were necessary (and thus exempted by
antitrust laws) in order to protect the investment of companies, since «the devel-
opment of the basic lines may involve considerable ﬁnancial commitment».30 The
Court joined the argument of advocate general Mischo, that some contractual
restrictions are required «to control the destination and the use of the basic seed;
otherwise [the owner] would risk the de facto loss of the exclusive rights granted to
him in respect of the new varieties which he has developed».31
The issue of exhaustion for patent rights on biotechnological inventions is now
dealt with under EC Directive 98/44 (art. 10) and the solution is not devoid of
difﬁculties, entangled as it is into general statements and speciﬁc exceptions. More
in details, art. 11 of the Directive states, by way of exception to the general prin-
ciple of protection, that the sale or other forms of commercialization of plant
propagating material [scil.: seeds] to a farmer, by the holder of the patent or with his
consent, for agricultural use implies authorization for the farmer to use the product
of his harvest for propagation or multiplication by him on his own farm, the extent
and conditions of this derogation corresponding to those under Article 14 of EC
Regulation 2100/94 (see, infra, next paragraph). In light of the mandatory nature of
29For a discussion of the current dimension of exhaustion in European Union law, see Schovsbo,
The Exhaustion of Rights and Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law, in Ohly
(edited by), Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law, Tübingen, 2012, 169.
30ECJ 19 April 1988, C-27/87, SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery c. La Hesbignonne SC, in ECR, 1988,
1919.
31Opinion of Advocate General Mischo of 9 December 1987, SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery c. La
Hesbignonne SC, par. 11 (in ECR, 1988, 1919).
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Article 11, single-use licenses in Europe are not enforceable if they aim to take
away from farmers the freedom granted by the Directive.
The relevant side of the provision, for what matters with respect to the purpose
of this paper, is that the exhaustion only applies to the extent seeds are used (also
for replanting) for internal purposes and not to put them in trade. Exchange of seeds
is not allowed because that practice would imply a use that is by the farmer but not
on his own farm. The ability to multiply the seeds for internal purposes has a
positive impact on farming, to the extent it allows the farmer to deal with geneti-
cally modiﬁed seeds and with their derivatives without necessarily being forced to
purchase seeds every season. Moreover, the farmer can mix his own seeds with
those purchased or with second generation seeds and promote, a least internally,
biodiversity.32
4.2 Concurring Forms of Protection: Utility Patents
and Plant Variety Registration (UPOV)
At an international level, a relevant source for intellectual property protection of
plant varieties is the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV convention). The convention has been introduced also in the
European Union with EC Regulation 2100/94 on Community Plant Variety Rights.
Importantly, as stated in art. 1 of the Regulation, its provisions are the sole and
exclusive form of protection for plant varieties in Europe.33
Plant varieties can be reproduced by natural techniques (for instance, by mere
cutting) and such circumstance is again a source of vulnerability for protection. The
extent to which exhaustion limits protection for breeders is deﬁned in art. 16 of the
UPOV convention. The breeder’s right shall not extend to acts concerning any
material of the protected variety, or of a variety covered by the provisions of art.14
(5) (concerning varieties which are essentially derived from the protected variety),
which has been sold or otherwise marketed by the breeder or with his consent in the
territory of one Contracting Party concerned, or any material derived from the said
material, unless such acts (i) involve further propagation of the variety in question
or (ii) involve an export of material of the variety, which enables the propagation of
the variety, into a country which does not protect varieties of the plant genus or
species to which the variety belongs, except where the exported material is for ﬁnal
consumption purposes.
32The interpretation of the Directive followed by the European Court of Justice is consistent with
the purpose to maintain a difﬁcult equilibrium for all the interests involved in this matter. For
instance, in Monsanto v. Cefetra, the ECJ stated that art. 9 of the Directive deﬁne a level of
harmonization that does not allow national Member States to increase the level of protection; see
ECJ July 6, 2010, C-428/08.
33The protection for plant varieties is also available in the U.S. with the Plant Varieties Protection
Act (PVPA). The relationship between utility patents and plant varieties patents has been discussed
in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). The case is
discussed by Daniels (2003), Rives (2001), Nilles (2000).
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Many Contracting States, including the European Union (as signatory party of
the Convention) within Regulation 2100/94, have adopted the solution that allows
to restrict the breeder’s right in relation to any variety in order to permit farmers to
use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest
which they have obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety
or a variety that is essentially derived by the one protected. Regulation 2100/94
limits this possibility to the varieties listed in art. 14.2.
Also in these sources there has been an attempt to reconcile a policy of incen-
tives with the need not to excessively restrict farmer’s freedom, at least with respect
to activities that can be considered “private” and that are presumptively of limited
impact on the market.34
There appears to be a divide between the U.S. law on agro-bio inventions and
the extent of patent protection, on the one side, and the European solution, coupled
with the international sources, on the other side. The U.S. system adopts a position
of absolute protection for innovators in biotechnological agriculture and accepts
unconditionally all the implications, including the use of contracts (and unilaterally
imposed terms) to further limit farmers’ freedom, if such freedom can pose a threat
to the exclusive rights of right holders or weakens his business model. Moreover,
the lack of exhaustion effects in case of self-reproducing matter is considered a
built-in feature of intellectual property protection. An uncompromising faith into
the incentives’ structure of patent laws seems to justify the policy.
On the other side, the European Union and many other countries, even if aware
of the difﬁculties in striking the right balance, are more in favor of a limited
freedom of farmers, by allowing exhaustion in circumstances where private use can
be reasonably accepted.
5 International Laws and the Interface Between
Intellectual Property Policy and Contract: The Nagoya
Protocol
The topic of genetically modiﬁed seeds cuts across other relevant aspects con-
cerning the international regime of trade in those ﬁelds where seeds are at the
beginning of the value chain. The values at play are not necessarily only those of
the biotech industry or of farmers. As it should be clear, to the extent biodiversity is
essential to ecosystems, the need to preserve non-genetically modiﬁed varieties
(while not discouraging biotechnological researches) is also extremely important
for the public at large. Moreover, outside most developed nations there is a kind of
agriculture that is inspired by communitarian values and that mixes elements of
cultural, economic, sometimes religious dimension.35
34To some extent, the grower can limit the ability of farmers to do certain things by contractual
restrictions, but without relying on property rights. Acts contrary to the restrictions only qualify as
breach of contracts, not as infringement.
35See Ferran (2014).
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When the destruction of biodiversity if feared as a possible consequence of an
indiscriminate use of stronger and more resistant varieties, all those values come to
play altogether and ﬁnding a balance point can be near to impossible. Preserving
biodiversity implies also a responsible use of the intellectual property rights at
national level and an enforcement of contracts that does not extend unreasonably
the powers conferred upon rights holders by intellectual property regimes. Differ-
ences in legal systems, in this respect, are not necessarily a negative thing, as it will
be clariﬁed in the next paragraphs.
Biodiversity can be at risk not only as a consequence of the introduction and
massive use of genetically modiﬁed varieties, but also by unauthorized access to
natural resources of communities where the environment is still rich and pristine,
compared to more industrialized and intensively cultivated territories. Such access
has often turned into biopiracy and to practices that have been identiﬁed as “pre-
dation” or neo-colonialism, in line with the warlike terminology mentioned at the
beginning.
In a sense, it sounds as a vivid paradox the fact that even the most advanced
research of developed countries needs access to local and poorly codiﬁed knowl-
edge generated at community level in less developed countries by a slow and steady
accumulation that lasted for centuries, if not for a 1000 years.36 The impact of such
access is sometimes dreadful, because resources are appropriated, modiﬁed, sub-
jected to intellectual property rights and then sold as new products to local farmers,
for whom such resources used to be free. Biodiversity is compromised, a regime of
commons is destroyed, resources become exclusive and other communitarian val-
ues are overridden.
In order to preserve biodiversity and combat biopiracy, member states which are
part of the Convention on Biodiversity eventually introduced a speciﬁc interna-
tional instrument, that is the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Beneﬁts Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity.37 The purpose of the Protocol is to make sure
that genetic resources are accessed under consent of the communities they belong to
and that utilization of genetic resources allows a fair and equitable share of beneﬁts
to such communities.38
The European Union has signed the Protocol on June 23, 2011 and has approved
it on May 16, 2014 with a speciﬁc regulation. In October 2012, the European
Commission presented a proposal for an EU Access and Beneﬁt Sharing
36One often quoted example of biopiracy is the case for the “devil’s claw” (Harpagophytum
procumbens), an herb native of the eastern and southern Africa that local communities of the San
people used as an anti-inflammatory and now widely employed in the pharmaceutical industry.
37The Protocol was adopted on October 29, 2010. See Tania Bubela, E. Richard Gold, Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge. Case studies and Conflicting Interests, EE, 2013.
Catherine Rodhes, Governance of Genetic Resources, EE, 2013. Charles Lawson, Regulating
Genetic Resources, EE, 2012.
38Levidow and Carr (1997), reported that unpaid royalties to less developed countries amount to
5.4 billion USD.
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(ABS) Regulation to implement the mandatory elements of the Nagoya Protocol for
the European Union. The European Parliament and the Council adopted the
new EU Regulation (No 511/2014) on 16 April 2014. It has entered into force on 9
June 2014. Entry into force of Regulation 511/2014 was made dependent on the
entry into force of the Protocol, which happened at its ﬁftieth ratiﬁcation.39
The main provisions of the regulation (art. 4, 5 and 7), concerning obligations in
the use and transfer of genetic resources will only become applicable one year after
the entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol. Regulation 511/2014 implements the
mandatory parts of the Protocol (basically a repetition of its main provisions),
whereas a further implementing regulation is currently being worked out, although
it is not yet clear when this is going to be adopted.40
One of the pillars in the policy of the Protocol is about due diligence efforts that
each private party has to exercise when receiving a genetic material, to make sure
the relevant provisions of the Protocol have been complied with.41 As a conse-
quence, a signiﬁcant role for the functioning of the Protocol is expected by Member
States of the EU, which will have the role of cooperating with the Commission to
lower, as much as possible, the due diligence costs associated with access to genetic
resources and traditional knowledge.42
Since seeds are genetic materials, under the terms of the Protocol, the use of
seeds and the genetic manipulation of plant varieties will be now subject to the
provisions of the Protocol. Hopefully, exotic varieties will not be appropriated and
modiﬁed without the consent of the local communities and phenomena of reverse
technology transfer will be avoided.43 Nothing in the Protocol prevents individuals
39As of the date of this writing (February 2015), the Protocol has been ratiﬁed by 59 States, out of
the 196 Parties of the CBD.
40There might be coordination problems in implementing the Protocol in Europe that might
eventually jeopardize its effectiveness. The European Union is one of the signatories of the
agreement, together with European Members States. Since several measures will depend on states,
there is the genuine risk that institutional activisms of the European Union will collide with
prerogative of Member States in implementing the instrument.
41Importantly, the protocol also refers to, and protect, the traditional knowledge associated with
genetic resources (see art. 7 of the Nagoya Protocol). Traditional knowledge is for genetic
resources what complementary know-how is for a patented technology. It resides in indigenous
and local communities and is part of their tradition.
42Due diligence is the pillar of the Protocol as far as circulation of genetic resources is concerned.
In each transaction, each party belonging to an implementing state will be subject to the duty to
ascertain whether the resource has been lawfully acquired (that is, in compliance with the principle
of access). In the past, it was suggested that one solution to ease the identiﬁcation of the origin of
resources was force applicants to declare the source of the material in the patent application. The
solution had been opposed, as burdensome, by the International Seed Federation (Disclosure of
Origin in Intellectual Property Protection Applications, Bangalore, 2003). Very likely it will be
considered again as a possible way to mitigate the duty of due diligence.
43Reverse technology transfer is the situation in which a state is supposed to pay to access
resources that are subject to proprietary rights of a third party, although such resources were
originally from the recipient state.
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and companies to resort to intellectual property protection for genetic resources that
have been appropriated, if the owner of the resource consented to access.
Furthermore, the legal relevance of the Protocol for genetically modiﬁed seeds
lies in the fact that genetic resources (including traditional know how) are subject to
the mechanism of consent and to an international property rights regime. There is
nothing inherently against intellectual property in the Protocol and nothing con-
clusive about the superiority of legal solutions to ﬁnd an equilibrium about values at
play. To the extent consensus is required, there is an implicit acknowledgement that
those resources are proprietary resources and cannot be freely appropriated or
modiﬁed or exchanged. The Protocol aims at ﬁghting biopiracy with the same legal
weapons that are conventionally used in Western countries: property and contracts.
The alternative option, one based on an international liability rule, would have been
better than the status quo, but less respectful of sovereignty of less developed
states.44
On a less positive note, unfortunately the Protocol is an international instrument,
whose application at national level depends on voluntary implementation by states
and although the level of acceptance is high, it should be underscored that the most
enthusiastic acceptance comes obviously from less developed countries. As it holds
for the CBD, one of the most important states in the world is not part of the
Protocol, that is, the United States. Thus, a very large portion of the world (one of
the most industrialized countries and the homeland of the most powerful agro-bio
industries) does not recognize and apply the principles of the Protocol, thus
introducing a wound to the underlying policy and escaping the international regime
of liability for access to genetic resources.45 The fact the U.S. are not part of the
Protocol is a big weakness to the overall international legal framework, because as a
matter of fact the main players of the genetically modiﬁed seed market are U.S.
multinational corporations. The Protocol here might prove less effective, but if
corporations are no longer generally free to appropriate genetic resources in bio-
diverse environments, it is a ﬁrst bulwark against plunder that nevertheless will
impact on individual conducts and business models. The Protocol is undeniably part
of the legal framework in which the issue of genetically modiﬁed seeds must be
deal with.
44The status quo is represented by a situation in which seed grabbing is actually practiced as in an
era of colonialism land grabbing was justiﬁed by a doctrine of terra nullius. The Protocol
recognizes sovereignty over national resources and rebuts the principle of free appropriability of
common resources. A solution that is close to liability rule was adopted by a number of national
legislations in the U.S., where farmers are allowed to use second generation seeds for sowing, by
compensating the rights holders, as reported by Leaven, The Misinterpretation of the Patent, cit.,
140.
45Since 1996, the U.S. territory is the land that is cultivated more than others with genetically
modiﬁed varieties, followed by Argentina, Canada, Brazil, China and South Africa.
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6 Negative Externalities
Differences in the legal framework that states create to govern the behavior of
players working on the value chain of seeds generate inevitable international
externalities. One remarkable example is represented by the U.S. position towards
the Nagoya Protocol. The option not to regulate the access to third parties’ genetic
resources provides an advantage to the national industry, but projects costs on less
developed countries and on other states that joined the Protocol. Overall, the
international trade is affected and the purposes of the Protocol might be frustrated or
strongly limited. The effectiveness of international legal instruments is inevitably
dependent on the widest acceptance.
Adopting a paradigm of regulatory competition on the very topic of agricultural
biotechnology can lead to the conclusion that, in order to attract the biotech
industry, state regulation should be more friendly for businesses, even if this choice
would harm farmers by increasing the costs to access seeds or by limiting their
ability to save and exchange seeds. At international level, the Nagoya protocol is a
set of mandatory rules that aims at limiting biopiracy and discouraging the kind of
race to the bottom that an unregulated competition among legal systems would
trigger. But the application of the protocol is ultimately made dependent on the will
of those same players that might take advantage from unregulated competition.
Furthermore, excessive regulation through mandatory rules can discourage inno-
vation and the transfer of technology and the Nagoya protocol is a delicate exercise
to keep a balance among the values at play.
A strategy of supporting the biotech business vis-à-vis the farmers with the
creation of a favorable legal environment (one that allows freedom of contract to the
maximum extent and that interprets intellectual property laws as univocally aimed
at protecting the right holder) has also negative effects at national level.
Concentration on the supply side is almost inevitable. Because of the capital
intensive investments required in the agro-bio industry, there is a natural trend
towards concentration and oligopoly, which is a further element of complexity to
ﬁnd an international legal equilibrium. As a matter of fact, the whole agro-bio
industry is in the hands of few high-tech, large and organized multinational cor-
porations, which can also exert lobbying power over decision-makers and can
easily cope with dispersed and less organized forces.46
The extent to which other branches of the legal system can control such powers
is unclear. A lenient treatment of contract practices for circulation of proprietary
technology clearly goes in the direction of reinforcing the position of the industry.
Beyond contract law and intellectual property, competition rules at national level
could only be applied in case of restrains on trade or abuses of dominant position
(attempt to monopolize the market, in the U.S.), but actions are unlikely. But since
46As reported by Center for Food Safety & Save Our Seeds, Seed Giants vs. Farmers, cit., 12,
three companies (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta) now control 53 % of the global market for
seeds, while the top ten companies have a joint market share of 73 % (and many of them are U.S.
corporations).
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an international regime of antitrust enforcement is missing, the effectiveness of
antitrust policy in this respect is doubtful.
It has been also argued that favoring the agro-bio industry and its products (like
genetically modiﬁed seeds) has effect on the demand side as well. High yield seeds
increase productivity, but the higher productivity comes at the cost of margins
reduction. Survival then becomes possible only for larger farmers with signiﬁcant
portions of land and ﬁnancial resources that can rely on large volumes of pro-
duction. The result is concentration also on the demand side, with the consequence
that smaller farmers are marginalized and doomed to disappear. And since biodi-
versity is strictly dependent on communities of smaller farmers, eventually the risk
of dominant varieties becomes actual.
There is evidence of this trend in Bowman. One argument raised by the farmer is
relevant. Bowman stated that the second sowing is necessary for running its
business, but it is riskier (than the ﬁrst one) and access to less expensive seeds
should justify its practice. Bowman’s position resembles pretty much like that of
many other small farmers worldwide that try to escape or relax the harshness of
Monsanto TSA. The argument is not a valid defense against the accusation of patent
infringement and provides no excuse from breach of contracts. But it reveals how
farmers are exposed to the costs to access seeds and with lower proﬁtability only the
large ones have the chance to survive, as long as they concentrate on specialized
monoculture, to make sure economies of scale ensure a satisfactory return on their
investments.
Last but not least, the intellectual property policy as a means to create incentives
for the biotech industry can feed opportunistic behaviors by large corporations with
internal research and development capabilities. Systems of ex post rewards leave
absolute freedom to individuals to pursue their own research agenda. This is one of
the undisputable virtues of intellectual property rights, vis-à-vis other more cen-
tralized forms of incentives. At the same time, the directions of research could favor
varieties that are more resistant to pesticides than to pests, and intellectual property
protection would be available for both.47 The choice about what should be com-
mercialized could be inspired by different motivations and interests. If a corporation
is active in sales for pesticides, it is not necessarily motivated to introduce on the
markets pest-resistant varieties. It would be too simplistic (and practically unfea-
sible) to conclude that the way to favor one direction and disfavor the other is to
allow protection only in the former case and not in the latter. Intellectual property
systems do not discriminate in this regard and it would be a very coarse policy to
throw the baby out with the bathwater.
With respect to this latter case, the answer is not necessarily in the intellectual
property policy. Many agro-bio products (including seeds) can be subject to reg-
ulations and controls and states do have other options to provide signals to the
47One often quoted side effect in terms of moral hazard of the massive resort to genetically
modiﬁed varieties is the increase in the consumption of pesticides/herbicides, which is not
necessarily an unwanted consequence from the perspective of the producer of such substances.
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industry in terms of what can be more easily commercialized.48 Incentives to
research and development can be left untouched, but more ﬁne-grained regulation
downstream can to some extent control opportunistic behavior and make sure that
commercial choices are consistent with the public interest and not just with the goal
of having short-term ﬁnancial returns.
But apart from monitoring the market from the easier perspective of regulating
products, other problems remain and it should be kept in mind that intellectual
property protection on genetically modiﬁed seeds has implications that go way
beyond the individual rewards for innovative products.
7 Regulation by Technology
The option to dismiss altogether the intellectual property policy in this ﬁeld would
be ineffective, if not ruinous, not just for the potential destruction of individual
incentives, but because one alternative for the industry would be to replace
exclusive rights with more uncompromising technological solutions.49
Of course, in a world of no intellectual property, the industry could raise prices
to compensate the loss of business that freedom to reproduce seeds would cause.50
This strategy would be tantamount to granting absolute protection in terms of
discrimination, as only large farming facilities could afford higher prices to access
selected seeds. However, the most baleful outcome would be choice to use tech-
nology to protect the genetically modiﬁed seeds.
Such possibility is open to the industry thanks to so called Genetic Use
Restrictions Techniques (GURTs), also referred to as “terminator” technology or
“suicide seeds”, that is to say genetic modiﬁcations that regulate the expression of
genes in plants, causing second generation seeds to become sterile.51 Such tech-
nological solutions would remove the self-reproducing traits of genetically modiﬁed
seeds that justify a different treatment of exhaustions effect. If second generation
seeds are sterile, “copies” are technically impossible and downstream control,
whether by contract techniques or by property prerogatives, does not make sense.
48Many legal systems, including the European Union, have regulated the downstream activities
that are required for a genetically modiﬁed product to reach the market. Regulation here serves the
additional purpose of controlling the impact of the technology on human health and the
environment, without discouraging research and development.
49Yet, it is an option that someone would pursue ﬁrmily; see for instance Boldrin and Levine,
Against intellectual monopoly, cit., 243 («[P]rogressively but effectively abolishing intellectual
property protection is the only socially responsible thing to do»).
50See Kesan, Licensing Restrictions, cit., 1086, with a further discussion of the complexity of the
value chain in the agro-industry.
51GURTs are typically split into two categories: those that restrict the use at variety level
(V-GURTs) and those that restrict at trait level (T-GURTs). One remarkable case of GURT is one
jointly developed by the Delta and Pine Land Company in cooperation with the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA). See International Seed Federation, Genetic Use Restriction Technologies,
Bangalore, 2003 (position paper describing V-GURT development).
Genetically Modified Seeds, Intellectual Property Protection … 109
GURTs are for genetically modiﬁed plant varieties what digital rights man-
agement systems (DRMs) are for technological copyright on digital goods; nothing
else than a technical response to the threat posed by imitation and reproduction to
intangible resources. With one remarkable difference. While legal solutions have
national validity and can be enforced at national level, technological solutions, like
GURTs and DRMs, do not need enforcement by national authorities and do not
suffer from sovereignty limitations. While this feature can be seen as an undispu-
table advantage, technological self-help comes to the cost of a complete removal of
any freedom, including fair uses that legislation might, by time to time, consider in
order to balance concurring interests. Technology, in this respect, is much less
modular and uncompromising. Above all, technological solutions remove any
chance of a regulatory competition and do not favor the emergence of alternative
solutions that states can occasionally enact. The mechanics of technological solu-
tions would be even more drastic in terms of consequences.
The topic of GURTs is not the only instance in which the regulatory role of
technology is discussed, but the essence of the issue is the same. GURTs imply
concentration of power in the hands of technology owners and escape the com-
prehensive systems of control and limits that are typical of legal regulation in terms
of territorial dimension, democratic participation to lawmaking, enforceability
before controllable institutions as courts.
There is an ongoing debate about the use of GURTs in the agro-bio industry, and
the discussions are not only legal; there are aspects of bio-security and food security
that must be dealt with accurately. Moreover, it has to be investigated the impact of
GURTs use on biodiversity. If genetically modiﬁed seeds are deactivated after the
ﬁrst sowing, the variety has less chance to become dominant. On the other side, the
potential decrease of costs of seeds—caused by the reduced vulnerability to
copying—could turn into lower prices and easier access for farmers to genetically
modiﬁed seeds that would eventually become dominant.
Whether regulation by technology is superior to state regulation is open to
discussion. For sure, it is not devoid of risks and side effects. Quite paradoxically,
regulation by technology can be in need of state laws, as it happens for techno-
logical protection measures in copyright. At the other extreme, state regulation
could outlaw the use of GURTs, and the relationship between the two techniques of
social control could be conflictual.
8 An Alternative Paradigm
The several implications of intellectual property protection applied to genetically
modiﬁed seeds, and the alternatives available, are evidence of the complexity of a
problem, that is the ability of regulation at any level to strike an acceptable balance
between innovation, farmers’ and communities’ rights, the demand to preserve
biodiversity and the objective need to limit international negative externalities
related to state strategies to attract foreign direct investments or to protect the
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national industry at the expenses of other countries (and of the international com-
munity at large).
In the ﬁeld of genetically modiﬁed seeds, resort to intellectual property pro-
tection is deemed to be cause of multiple side effects, that eat into biodiversity,
market concentration and the promotion and protection of other (communitarian)
values. In the complexities of regulation, and taking into account all its limitation,
one signiﬁcant support comes from the Nagoya protocol. To the extent plunder of
genetic resources (and local varieties among them) is barred, or made more difﬁcult
by an international instrument, each country has now more effective means to
preserve its genetic diversity and its identity. This is a ﬁrst small step and there
might be technical difﬁculties in making it work properly, but it is a crucial
contribution.
Before a paradigm of regulatory competition, there is sometimes the impression
that the race to the bottom is inevitable and independent by states’ will.52 But it is
not. At least, lowering the level of protection of non-economic values is not the
only available approach if policy makers at state level are willing to pursue alter-
native models of growth. Diversity in regulation can be instrumental in favoring, at
least initially, a strategy of differentiation with respect to other countries without
necessarily refusing an intellectual property policy.
Intellectual property rights seem to be supportive of one model of extremely
centralized and concentrated agriculture, with low margins for big farmers, based
on genetically modiﬁed resources, intensive exploitation of large portions of land
with monocultures and propagation of market power in other markets (it is not a
secret that the largest rights holders on genetically modiﬁed seeds also produce
herbicides and pesticides). That model is probably responsible for providing
resources in bulks, for a fast-growing world, wherever plants can be used for food,
energy or raw materials productions. But if a given country does not see ﬁt with that
model, other solutions are available.
There can be an alternative model, based on high-quality productions of
bio-diverse local varieties (still somehow protected against imitations and, thus,
subject to intellectual property rights), cultivated with traditional methods at a very
decentralized level by farmers and communities of farmers. The two systems can
compete but competition has to be fair and regulation (both at state and interna-
tional level) is mandated to ensure a level playing ﬁeld for the two models.
If promoting alternative models of exploitation is the goal, then legal solutions
should be consistent. For instance, the answer adopted by the European Directive
98/44 with respect to exhaustion and farmers rights is somehow responsive to the
need for farmers to have some limited internal use of second generation seeds.
There is an equilibrium in there, but is different from that found by the U.S. courts
52States have different options to pursue a strategy of attracting foreign investors. Magic (2003,
p. 6), stated that «attracting FDI—and consequently technology transfer—solely by means of
strengthening IPR is not a good long term economic strategy for a developing country because it
will not do nothing to build a domestic industry of high-tech R&D».
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in Bowman and it is not said that it is a bad one. After all, the agro-bio industry does
business also in Europe.
The case of intellectual property rights on genetically modiﬁed seeds is one
remarkable example of the direct connection between strategies of growth and
regulation, when multiple interests are at play. The seed war is way too often fought
in a dismissive way, as a war in favor or against intellectual property protection.
This attitude might result destructive of incentives for states to experiment back-
ground legal conditions for alternative models of agriculture that rely on a more
reasonable use of intellectual property rights and a more equitable sharing of
resources. The Nagoya Protocol aims at ﬁghting biopiracy by reinstating principles
of sovereignty, property and consent. Those same principles are common to
intellectual property policy. As the agro-bio industry is able to combine property
rights and contractual techniques to serve their purposes, there might be alternative
combinations to support an agriculture that is grounded on different values and is
more respectful of local communities.
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